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ABSTRACT
Recent decades have witnessed a sharp increase in the labor force
participation of married women. The paper investigates the effect of wives'
earnings on family income distribution. This effect depends on the in-
equality of women's earnings as compared with other sources of income, on
the correlation between the two and on the woman's share in total income.
These in turn depend on participation patterns, labor supply and sex related
wage differentials. In general, only the correlation between the various
sources of income has an unambiguous effect on inequality, the effects of
the other factors depending on the specific values of the parameters.
In Israel where there are sharp differences in participation rates
of married women and in sex related earnings differentials by schooling
group, wives' earnings reduce total family income inequality, increasing
at the same time the between—group (ethnic and schooling group) variability.
The paper examines the effect of changes in the participation rate and the
wife—husband earnings gap on family income inequality. It compares the
effect of wives' earnings with other income sources (e.g., transfers)
and examines the implication of separate tax returns for inequality.
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A. INTRODUCTION
The upsurge in the labor force participation of married women that
has taken place in many Western societies in the last decades proved to be
an economist's bonanza. Economists ranged far and wide to explore its
effect on marriage, divorce, fertility, time spent with children, and other
time uses. It may, therefore, look somewhat surprising how little economists
have mined their own backyard. It is only recently that they have approached
the classical problem of income distribution. Though much effort has been
spent explaining sex—related earnings differentials, relatively little has
been done to analyze the effect of the increased participation of married
women on the inequali,ty of family income distribution, an issue of perhaps
greater importance.I Given the large fraction of life one spends as a
member of a multiperson household sharing resources and expenditures, the
distribution of welfare among society members depends to a large extent
on the distribution of resources among its families, and it is, therefore,
of interest to investigate to what extent the recent changes in the labor
force composition have affected this distribution.
It has been shown (Layard and Zabalza, Smith) that the answer to this
problem is far from simple. The effect of women's earnings on inequality
depends on the inequality of women's earnings as compared with other sources
of income, on the correlation between the two, and on the women's share
in total family income. These in turn depend on participation patterns,
supply of labor and sex related wage differentials. It is most difficult
to separate the various effects since they tend to interact in more than
This research was supported by NSF Grant So 79O7848.
1/ . . . . . — Mincer[1974] was one of the first to discuss this topic. In his thorough
analysis of male earnings, he discusses briefly the impact of growth of the
female labor force, concluding that it, "while increasing earning inequality
among all persons, has actually been a factor in the mild reduction of money
income inequality among families."—2—
one way. Recent studies have emphasized the role of the correlation beteen
the wife's earnings and other sources of income as a major determinant.-!
Our analysis indicates that it is not generally possible to pinpoint a
single factor as the crucial variable and, in particular, the sign of the
correlation coefficient is far from sufficient to predict the effect of the
increasing prevalence of two—earners families on income inequality. Given
the complexity of the problem, little can be inferred from the American
and British experience (analyzed by Smith and Layard and Zabalza) about
the effect of women's earnings on family income inequality in other places,
or at other times.
To demonstrate this complexity and to come to a better understanding of
the problem in other respects as well, I examine the case of Israel. The
labor force participation rate of Jewish married women in Israel increased
over the last two decades by more than one half (from 24.5 percent in 1959
to 37 percent in 1978). Past studies (Gronau, 1978) have shown that wives'
labor force participation patterns are strongly influenced by education,
and there existed a large difference in participation patterns between
Asian—African born and European—American born or Israeli born. We use data
from the 1975/76 Family Expenditure survey to examine the differential
effect of wives' earnings on the inequality of income of the various educa-
tion and ethnic groups, and the inequality in the population as a whole.
The paper opens with a theoretical analysis of the implications for
family income inequality of superimposing the wife's earnings distribution
on the distribution of other sources of income. I identify the main players,
namely wives' labor force participation rate, the wife—husband earnings
ratio (when both are employed), their relative dispersion and their correla-
tion, and examine their interactions. The next section introduces the
players in the Israeli context. The wives' earning structure, the wif e—
husband earnings ratio, and labor force participation are analyzed.
Schooling is observed to be the major factor explaining participation,
earnings and changes in husband—wife wage differentials. Other things
being equal, wives' hourly earnings are on average only 70—75 percent of
those of husbands', but the wage gap narrows considerably with education.
The effect of schooling on participation is sufficiently strong to sweep
the opposite income effect, giving rise to a positive correlation between
husbands' and wives' earnings. Wives' earnings are shown (in Section D)
to reduce family earnings inequality. The reduced inequality is due pri-
marily to a decline in within—group variation, which offsets the increase
in between—group (education and ethnic group) variability. These changes
are traced to intergroup differences in wives' participation, the other
factors having only a marginal effect in the Israeli case.
That is true for Smith and to a lesser degree for Layard and Zabalza.
Smith explains the difference between white and black families in the
effect of wives' earnings on inequality by the positive correlation that
exists between wife's and husband's earnings in black families and the
negative correlation in white families (wife's earnings having an important
compensatory function in white families but much less so in black families).—3—
Sex related wage discrimination affects inequality in many ways.
The wage gap by itself tends to reduce inequality, but since this gap is
not the same for all schooling and ethnic groups, between—group variability
may increase. However, both these effects are observed to be marginal.
More important is the dampening effect the wage gap has on wives' partici-
pation, but even this effect is only moderate. Finally, the Israeli tax
structure which allows for separate tax returns, neutralizes much of the
distributional effect of the wives' earning and, thus, exerts a regressive
influence on family income distribution.—4—
B. WOMEN'S EARNING ANDINEQUALITYIN FAMILY INCOME
The exact effect of the wives' earnings on the family's income distri—
bution depends, naturally, on the measure of inequality chosen. Of the
traditional measures (e.g., the coefficient of variation, the variance of
the logarithm of income, the Gini coefficient, Atkinson'smeasure of inequa-
lity) the easiest to analyze in this context is the coefficient of variation.
This analysis will, hopefully, highlight the major factorsaccounting for
inequality.
For simplicity let us assume that the family has only twopotential
sources of income husband's and wife's earnings, and that the husband is
always employed.-i Let and denote the means, Gand the standard
deviations and C1 and C2 the coefficients of variation of husband's and
wife's earnings, respectively, and let p denote the correlation betweenthe
two. The coefficient of variation of family income (C), is the weighted
average of the coefficients of variation of the individual components and
the covariation among them, where the weights are determinedby the mdlvi—
dual's contribution to family income.
(1) C2
2
+ (1—a)2 C + 2a(l-a)pC1C2
where a is the husband's share in total income (a =p1/p
=
Thecoefficient of variation of family income is always smaller than the
weighted average of its individual components (C <
aC1+ (1—a)C2) unless the
latter are perfectly positively correlated (p=l).Comparing family income
with husband's earnings, the ratio of their coefficients of variation
(E =CIC1) depends on the ratio of the individual components (0 =
C2/C1),
on their correlation and on the share parameter a
(2) E2(C/C1)2 =a2 + (1-a)22 + 2(1)0
Specifically, the introduction of wives' earnings reduces income inequality
(E<l) if
FTheseassumptions can be easily removed and are used only for simpli-
city of notation.
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The probability that thi1.s holds is a non—decreasing function of the husband's
share in family income! and a decreasing function of the correlation between
wives' and husbands' earnings (p) and their relative dispersion (0).
Generally, the higher the correlation between the earnings of husband
and wife, the more likely that women's earnings increase the inequality in
family income (E). When this correlation is positive, inequality is enhanced
as the inequality in the wife's earning relative to the husband's (0)in-
creases. However, the effect of 0isnot monotonic, and when the corelation
is sufficiently negative (p <—0(1—a)Ia) an increase in S reduces E .'
Finally,the effect of the husband's share in family incomen inequality is
ambiguous, and depends on the exactmagnitudesof a, p and E3,L
B(0—p) (4) -—-<O as a- 2
i—2p0-I-0
Only if p >0or p >1/0isthe sign of the effect on E of a change in the
husband's share (a) independent of the exact size of this share (E/a is
positive in the first case and negative in the second.)/ If 0 >1(as is
usually the case) and p <1/0an increase in a reduces E for low values of
a and increases it for high values.
Variations in a2, a and p are, in general, not independent, since all
three are affected by common factors. They depend on the labor force parti-
cipation rate of women, on the supply of labor of working women, and on the
male—female wage differentials. Formally let P denote the rate of parti-
cipation,—theratio of female to male earnings where the wife is employed
(0 depends in turn on the ratio of working hours and the relative wage),
and let xdenotethe ratio of the wife's coefficient of variation of earnings
The derivative of theright hand side of equation (3) with respect to a is
2 2 22 1/2
C2{p -a(l+a)(l—p)[l -(1—p)a I -[1-(l-p2)a2] }/(l+a)2
This term is non—negative for all values of p .1.
6/ 2
2(l-a)[(l-a)0 + apj
Li 2 =2[a(1+ e— 2p0)+ O(p—O)]
Thefirst of these terms is always positive, hence we can derive (4).
Thesetwo cases are, clearly, mutually exclusive since p >0implies 0 <1
andhence p <1/0and vice versa.—6—
tohusband's(y =C2/C1,where e denotes employed persons). The share of
the wives' earnings in total income of two—earner families equals 3/(l+13),
and their share in the population as a whole is P/(l+1P). Hence,
(5) =l/(l+P)
The variance of the wives' earnings distribution depends on the variance in
the su1set of employed wives, on their mean earnings and on the participation
rate
(6) =2e+P(l-P)'2e
The squared coefficient of variation of wives' earnings equals,therefore,
(7) C =[C
+ (1-P)J/P =[y2C+(i-P)]/p
2 22 lP 2 1/2
(8) E={l+P(y+—i--) + 2p[P(y +
Cl C1
The number of hours that women work is much less standardized than that
of men, a much larger percentage of women opting for a part time job (i.e.,
fewer hours or fewer weeks). An increase in the variability of working hours
results in an increase in y and an increase in 0. The effect of this change
on E depends on the size of p.
BE 1—ct 2 1/2
(9) as p ? ———--0———13P[——-i--——_]
PC1
Changes in hours or in weeks worked as well as changes in the wage dif-
ferential effect the sex—related earnings ratio, 0. An increase in 0 in-
creases the wife's and reduces the husband's share in family income and has,
therefore, an indeterminate effect on E. A change in the wives' participa-
tion rate reduces both the husband's share in family income and the relative
dispersion, 0. These two changes may very often have opposite effects on H.
To deriveequation (6) recall that the variance of a population that is
composed of two groups (employed and not employed) consists of the sum of
the variance within the groups (2) and the vaiiance between their means
(2)
w2 2 b
The first term in (6) represents and the second cYb.To derive (7) recall
that p2 =2e—7--
Furthermore, changes in participation may be accompanied by changes in wage
differentials, dispersion of hours of working women and the correlation be-
tween wives' and husbands' earnings.
Thus, in response to the question how do women's earnings affect income
inequality, one has to revert to the economist's favorite answer "It
depends. ..".
C.EARNING ANDPARTICIPATIONPATTERNS —THEISRAELI EXPERIENCE
The previous section described the conflicting factors affecting family
earnings inequality. It has been shown that the effect of the wives' earn-
ings depends on the exact configuration of these factors, and hence may dif-
fer in different environments. This section analyzes two of the main prota-
gonists, the earnings and participation functions, how they interact and how
they affect other parameters, such as the correlation between husband's and
wife's earnings.
Our testing ground is Israel. Israel has witnessed substantial changes
in the composition of its labor force over the last decades. Labor force
participation of men has dropped over the period 1955—78 from 80 to 65 per-
cent, while the rate for women has increased from 28 to 37 percent, and that
for non—single women has increased from 23 to 37 percent (the share of men
in the labor force dropping over the period from 75 to 65 percent). A
prime cause for the increase in women's (and specifically, married women's)
participation is the continuous improvement in schooling levels of both men
and women in Israel. The effect of schooling on participation and earnings
and, consequently, on the wife—husband earnings ratio is one of the main
themes of this section. The other theme is ethnic differences in partici-
pation and earnings. Asian—African born wives have lower earnings and a
lower participation rate than their European—American and Israeli counter-
parts. Part of this difference can be explained by the schooling differen-
tial (Asian—African born wives have on the average 6.8 years of schooling,
as compared with 11.0 for the others), but given the high social sensitivity
of this issue it is worth examining whether ethnic origin has an indepen—.
dent effect of its own.'
-'Axnirreports significant differences between the hourly earnings of males
of Asian—African origin and those of European—American origin, even if one
controls for schooling and experience. Weiss, Fishelson and Artzi report
similar differentials exist in the case of females. In a previous study
(Gronau 1978) I could not detect any significant difference in wives' earnings
but there was a significant difference in the participation function of the
two groups (other things equal, Asian African born tended to participate
less in the labor force). In some of these studies the Asian—African group
includes Israeli born of Asian—African origin. In this study, Israeli born
wives are included in the European—American group.—8—
The data used in this study are derived from the 1975—76 Family Expendi-
ture Survey and relate to married Jewish families.-UI A major feature of the
earnings data is the wage differential between wives and husbands, and the
differentials among wives of different schooling and ethnic background.
Wives' earnings are on the average less than half those of their husbands
(where both partners are employed). This disparity is generated by, both.
an annual hours differential and a wage gap. Annual working hours
of wives are about two thirds those of their husbands, while the hourly
earnings ratio is about 3:4. Asian—African born wives have hourly earnings
which are less than 80 percent of those of the European—American or Israeli
born, and wives with less than 9 years of schooling have hourly earnings
which are less than 70 percent of those with more than 12 years of schooling.
What may account for these differentials?
To answer these questions, I estimated semi—log hourly earnings functions
for husbands and wives. The explanatory variables, besides the person's
schooling and ethnic origin, include his potential experience in the labor
force (measured as age minus schooling minus 6), the number ofyears in
Israel, th2yumber of young children (less than 2 years old) and the spouse's
education.— The results are reported in Table 1.
A year in school increases wife's earnings by about 7 percent, but the
effect may not be linear and may depend 9n the level and kind of schooling
(e.g., vocational vs. non—vocationa1).iJ Earnings increase with potential
experience (i.e., years since last school) but at an ever decreasing rate
(hourly earnings of people with different schooling levels may converge
over time).
original sample collected over the period June 1975 -May1976 includ—.
ed about 2250 urban households. After removing the non—married and the non—
Jews the sample thins down to 1780 observations (some of the major charac—
teristics of the sample are described in Table Al of the appendix). For
technical reasons, we used in some of the computations a random subsample of
1492 observations.
'TheFamily Expenditure Survey does not include any direct information on
hourly earnings. Hourly earnings are defined, therefore, as the ratio of
annual earnings divided by annual hours. Annual hours aredefined, in turn,
as weeks worked in the previous year times normal number of hoursper week.
Self employed were not asked about their weekly hours so thehourly earnings
data refers only to wage and salary workers. Potentialexperience was used
in the absence of direct information on actual experience.
functional form that incorporates the type of the last school attended
as a set of dummy variables (regression (2)) does marginally better than the
function that incorporates schooling as a continuous variable. The effect
of cchoo1inc i cornnitA.t thcmeanvalueof19.12 years of experience.—9—
TABLE 1: HOURLY EARNINGS FUNCTIONS; WIVES
(Dependent Variable: in Hourly Earnings)
(1) (2) (3)
b t b t b t
Intercept 0.7609 3.691.943 18.230.6752.75
Husband's Schooling (yrs) 0.0182.890.022 3.98 0.0172.34
Wife's Schooling (yrs) 0.1016.99 0.1096.51














Experience x Schooling —0.0017 3.54 —0.0014 2.57





R2 0.315 0.337 0.314
Sample Size 510 510 416
Comments: Years in Israel are measured in units of 10 years. The schooling
dummy variables are: 1—elementary school, 2—vocational highschool,
3—teacher's college, 4—other non—academic post—highschool education,
5—college and university, 6—other. The base group is highschool.—10—
TABLE 1 (Cont'd): HOURLY EARNINGS FUNCTION: HUSBANDS
(Dependent Variable: in Hourly Earnings)
(4) (5) (6)
b t b t b t






















R2 0.218 0.235 0.223
Sample Size 1032 1032 416
Comments: Years in Israel are measured in units of 10 years.—11—
The effect of experience is augmented by the length of stay in Israel,every
year increasing hourly earnings by about 3/4 of a percent. Wife's hourly
earnings are affected by her family environment, increasing with her hus-
band's education and the number of young children. The first of these ef-
fects may be attributed to selective mating —themore able women marrying
the more educated men. The second effect may reflect a selectivity bias —
onlywomen with high hourly earnings participate in the labor force when
they have young children (Gronau 1974) .Surprisinglyabsent from the re-
gression are the variables relating to ethnic origin. A detailed exaniina—
tion indicates that none of these variables is significant, though Asian—
African born wives' earnings may be more sensitive to formal education
than their European—American and Israeli counterparts' (the interaction term
is barely significant at a level of significance of 10 percent).
Years in school are also a major determinant of hourly earnings in the
case of the husbands. The effect of schooling on husband's earnings
is almost identical to that of the wife's (regression 4). However
this estimate declines considerably once we allow for the effect of the
wife's education on her husband's earnings (regression (5)). The last
effect can, again, be attributed to selective mating, or, as has been
sometimes claimed, (Benham), to the beneficial effect wives have on their
husbands' productivity, an effect that seems to increase with educa-
tion. The hourly earnings—experience profile is concave as expected, the
effect of potential experience having a stronger effect in the case of the
husband than in the case of the wife (reflecting the higher ratio of actual to
potential years of experience for the first group). Years of residency in
Israel have a positive effect and the number of children have no significant
effect on their father's hourly earnings. Of the ethnic groups, only one
stands out —Israelihusbands whose fathers were born in Europe or America.
Other things being equal, members of this group enjoy hourly earnings
which are almost 20 percent higher than those of members of other ethnic
groups. It is notable, however, that there exists no significant difference
between the ho9rly earnings of Asian—African born and European—American born
married men.-iU
The estimates of the hourly earnings function may be affected by
selectivity bias since only a fraction of the wives' population is repre-
sented in the labor force. Since this fraction isself—selected it is
not clear that the sample we observe is random (specifically, it is not
clear that the random component in the earnings function is not9orrelated
with the explanatory variables through the selection process) To
correct for this potential bias we introduced in the wage functions the
inverse of the Mills ratio (Heckman). This change did not improve the
explanatory power of the hourly earnings functions. However, certain va-
riables which previously seemed to have a significant effect turn out to be
insignificant. Of special interest is the effect of young children on
their mothers' hourly earnings, which vanishes in the new formulation
(regression (3)), confirming the suspicion that this effect reflects merely
'These resultsare consistent with results reported by Fishelson, Weiss,
Mark.
-'See the appendix fora more detailed analysis of the implications of the
selectivity bias.—12—
a selectivity bias. Similarly, the wife's effect on her husband's earnings
weakens considera1ly (it is significant but only at a level of significance
of 10 percent) .-IThisresult is consistent with the assumption of selective
mating, i.e., the random components in the two earnings functions are posi-
tively correlated.
Schooling turns out to be the major (actually, the sole) explanation for
the hourly earnings differential between Asian—African born wives and those
born in Europe or America. Can schooling (or any combination of observed
characteristics) explain the sex—related hourly earnings differentials?
An examination of the husbands' and wives' characteristics in the sample
where both partners are employed (Table 2), suggests that there exist only
minor differences in the observed characteristics, much too small to explain
the wide wage gapJiI This impression is supported by Table 3, where I try
to account for differences in characteristics by comparing the wife's actual
hourly earnings with the hourly rate her husband would have received had he
possessed his wife's characteristics (method I), or alternativelycomparing
the husband's actual hourly earnings with that of the wife's had she hadher
husband's characteristics (method II)./
Wives are making on the average about 75 percent of the hourly earnings
of husbands with the same observed characteristics. Hence, there is very
little in socio—economic variables that can explain the observed hourly
earnings gap. This gap however, is not constant and narrows down as educa-
tion increases. It is about 40 percent of the husband's rate for wives
with less than 9 years of schooling and only about 10 percent for wives with
more than 12 years of schooling, reflecting the higher rate of return to
other changes worth mentioning are: a) the weakening of the effect of
experience in the wife's hourly earnings function (the effect becomes en—
tirely insignificant when schooling is represented by dummy variables, as
in column (2), and b) (schooling)2 becomes insignificant in the hourly
earnings function of husbands. The coefficients indicating a selectivity
bias are both significant. The coefficient for wives is positive implying
that a unit increase in the wife's market productivity is associated with an
increase of less than a unit in productivity at home. The coefficient in the
husband's function is negative implying that the husband's productivity in
the market is affected more by his wife's productivity at home than by her
productivity in the market. Note, also, that these results are not strictly
comparable with earlier results because of the composition of the sample.
The censoring effect is measured in a subsample of families where both hus-
band and wife are employed.
'Given the self—selectednature of this sample and the nature of the parti-
cipation function, the differences between husband and wife characteristics
are even smaller than in the sample as a whole.
'The predictedhourly earnings were derived using regressions 2 (corrected
for selectivity bias) and 6 in Table 1.Similar results are obtained using


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 wives' schooling as compared with males')" The smaller wage gap for better
educated women results in a smaller wage gap for European—American born as
compared with Asian—African wives.
Schooling is also the prime actor when it comes to the participation deci-
sion, where it plays more than one role. It affects the pecuniary rewards
the woman can expect in the market, the nonpecuniary rewards, and her pro-
ductivity at home. In order to separate these effects, one has to impute
the wife's wage, since earnings are known only for employed women. Apply-
ing the hourly earnings function reported in Table 1 (regression 2 corrected
for selectivity bias), I estimated the labor force participation function
of Israeli married women. Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent
variable I used the logit method (applying a logistic curve to the partici-
pation data). The explanatory variables are the wife's schooling, her age,
land of birth, length of stay in Israel, her imputed hourly earnings, the
family's income (wife's earnings excluded) and the number and age
of children.
Table 4 reports the coefficients of the logit function, their corres-
ponding standard errors, and the marginal effect of the explanatory varia-
bles [= bP(l—P)].Reflecting, either a life—cycle effect or merely a
cohort effect, participation tends to decline with age (except for the young
ages). Length of stay in Israel which has figured in earlier studies as an
important variable explaining participation (Gronau 1978), seemed to lose
its importance in the 70's and was not included in the final versions of the
regression. Children maintain their strong deterrent effect on participation,
in particular those in the preschool ages (a child in this age group reduces
his mother's probability of participation by almost 20 percentage points).
Other things equal, Asian—African born have been observed in the past to
participate less than their European—American born counterparts. This
disparity has vanished, and the only group standing Out in terms of par-
ticipation is the Israeli born. The wife's hourly earnings and family in-
come have the expected opposite effects: a ten percent increase in wages
increases participation by 2.4 percentage points. On the other hand, a ten
percent increase in family income reduces participation by 0.7 percentage
points. Controlling for hourly earnings, schooling has an independent posi-
tive effect on participation, reflecting the effect of non—pecuniary rewards
of work in the market. Each additional year of schooling increases parti-
cipation by almost 3 percent.
Our earlier findings indicate that an additional year of schooling
contributes about 7 percent to hourly earnings. Combining the wage effect
and the schooling effect, a year of schooling increases participation by
4.6 percentage points (=1.7+ 2.9). This effect more than offsets the
negative effect of income (a year of school is associated with an increase
of income of 3.6 percent, and a reduction of participation of 0.25 percen-
tage points). The. positive correlation between the husband's and the wife's
'These sex-related hourly earnings differentialsare more sensitive to
level of schooling when one uses standardization —methodI than when one
uses method II.—16—

































Age 0—1 —0.7970.175—0.191—0.7720.176 —0.150—0.192
Age 2—5 —0.7900.121—0.189—0.7430.122 —0.145—0.184











*Computed at the sample mean.
**Computed at the group—means.—17—
schooling and the strong association between schooling, participation, and
earnings give rise to a positive correlation between the husband's and the
wife's earnings.
The rate of participation of Asian—African born wives is almost 20
percentage points lower than that of European American and Israeli born.
This difference is explained almost entirely by the difference in schooling
levels, ethnic origin having no independent effect on the level of
participation. It has been observed, however, in an earlier study (Gronau
1978) that wives with different ethnic origins react differently to pecu-
niary and non—pecuniary market rewards. These findings are supported by
our sample. While Asian—African born wives are attracted to the labor
force primarily by pecuniary motives, the European-American born place a
higher value on the non—pecuniary element in the rewards (Table 4, regression
II). In either case the positive effect of schooling by far outweighs the
negative effect of income, leading to positive correlation between the
earnings of husband and wives.
Finally, examining the effect of the explanatory variables on the number
of annual working hours (in a sample of working wives) indicates that neither
wages, nor income, schooling and ethnic origin have any effect, the only
variables of importance being the wife's age and the number and age
of her children (Table 5).—18—






Years of Schooling 17.68 1.21
Wife land of birth: AsAf 19.61 0.22
Israel —64.75 0.83
Children: age 0—1 —331.06 4.11
age 2—5 —128.03 2.29
age 6—13 —101.63 2.63
age 14+ —147.63 2.16
ln(Hourly Earnings) —204.80 1.23
ln(Income) 6.82 0.17
R 0.119—19--
D. FMILY INCOME INEQUALITY -DO WIVES' EARNINGS MATTER?
Past studies in the U.S. and the U.K. (Mincer, Layard and Zabaiza,
Smith) have shown that wives' earnings tend to reduce the inequality of
family incomes, although their distribution has a much greater (relative)
variation than that of husband's earnings. Does Israel exhibit thesame
pattern?
Our initial investigation focuses exclusively on wife's and husband's
earnings, ignoring all other sources of income,' and the answer suggested
by Table 6 seems to be unequivocal —wives'earnings reduce family earnings
inequality (the coefficient of variation declines by over 5 percent from
0.78 to 0.73). The decline is, however, far from uniform. While there is
hardly a noticeable change in the measure of inequality in the lowest
schooling group and among Asian—African born families, there is almost a
10 percent decline among European—American born, and over 15percent de-
cline in the highest schooling group. Moreover, the decline in the within—
group variation (a decline from 0.78 to 0.72 for the ethnic groups and from
0.76 to 0.68 in the school groups) is associated with an increase in the
between—groups variation. Thus, the gap between the mean earnings of the
ethnic groups and the earnings differential between the highest and the
lowest school group increase by over 60 percent (the between—groups coef-
ficients of variation increase from 0.09 to 0.12, and from 0.21 to0.29,
respectively).
The changes in inequality can be directly traced to the positive
association between schooling and participation on the one hand, and the
narrowing of the wife—husband hourly earnings ratio as schooling increases
on the other. Both factors result in an increase in the wife's share in
total earnings. This share is only 7 percent for wives with less than
9 years of schooling and 26 percent for those with more than 12years of
schooling; it is 12 percent for Asian—African born wives, and 18 percent for
European—American born. The increased participation drastically changes
the wife—husband relative earnings variation (9). The value of 0 falls
from 3.4 to 1.6 for the schooling groups, and from 3.3 to 1.9 for the
ethnic groups.
The different contribution of wives to family earnings are thesource
of the increasing inequality between groups, while the reduction in the
wives' relative variability (0) can be accredited for the decline in the
total and within—group variability. As has been shown in sectionB, given
the low correlation between husbands' and wives' earnings,a reduction in
O reduces inequality. At a theoretical level, this effectmay have been
counterbalanced by the increase in the wives' shares (1—a), but surprisingly,
in spite of the drastic changes in this share, it hardly affected the final
outcome (i.e., maintaining 0 at its mean value and changing a hardly
affects E).
'Earnings include income fromself—employment.—20—
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The effects on overall earnings inequality of the wife's earnings share
and her earnings variability can be demonstrated with the help of Figure 1.
The figure describes the value of E for various rates of participation P
and wife—husband earnings ratios ,assumingp, C1, and y are given at
their sample mean levels (p =0.1,C1 =078,C2 =0.64).An increase
in ,forgiven value of P, increases the wife's share, without affecting
the relative variation 0. On the other hand, changes in P which are accom-
panied by offsetting changes in(i.e., a movement along a rectangular
hyperbola 3P =constant),trace the net effect of changes in variability
0. Given the mean rate of participation P =0.4,changes inin the range
0.3 << 0.7hardly affect E. On the other hand, increasing P in this range
reduces E sharply.
The figure shows that the mitigating effect of wife's earnings on inequa-
lity should in no way be regarded as a universal rule.For our sample means
of p, C1 and y, inequality could have increased had the participation
rate been sufficiently small (P <0.4)and the wife—husband earnings ratio
sufficiently high. Given the parametric values of p, C1, and y, an increase
in participation increases earnings inequality for very low values of P
(remember when P =0E =1),but for P >0.1inequality always declines.
Changes in the wife—husband earnings ratio have the opposite effect. In-
creases inare initially accompanied by a decline in inequa],ity but
eventually the trend turns around and inequality increases.i
One of the most striking features of the observed wives' earnings
structure is the presence of the significant unexplained male—female wage
differential. Part of this gap is often attributed to sex discrimination,
and much effort has gone to isolate this part. Yet little has been done
to clarify the distributional effect of the wage disparity. A pertinent
question is, therefore, how the closing of this gap would affect the income
distribution. In answering, one should distinguish between primary and
secondary effects. The primary effect is an increase in wives' wages and,
consequently, in their shares of family income. Given the different ini-
tial gaps in hourly earnings for the various schooling groups, wage equali-
zation requires non—uniform wage increases —thewage increasing most for
the least educated. The secondary effects are associated with a wage
induced increase in participation. The increase in labor supply has in
turn a direct impact on inequality, as well as indirect effects through
possible changes in the variability of hours worked and in the correlation
between wife's and husband's earnings.
Can one measure the effect of sexre1ated wage discrimination on
inequality? The answers are necessarily going to be very crude. Wage
discrimination is only one of the possible causes of differential worker
retribution, others being the type of professional skills acquired in
school, the intensity of on—the—job training, and the fraction pecuniary
rewards constitute in total market compensation. There is no way to separate
these factors and, thus, one can provide only an upper limit to the effect
21/































































































































































































of discrimination, assuming that the whole wage gap is imputable to it.
Similarly, it will be difficult to estimate the effect of the elimination
of wage differentials on wives' labor supply. The closing of thewage gap
may affect the patterns of specialization in the household, fertility, and
the long term commitment of wives to market careers. Again one has to do
with partial answers: estimating the short run effect of thewage increase
using the labor force participation function.
Full wage equality would leave differences in hours worked as the sole
source of earnings differentials, and would increase 13 from the observed
0.46 to 0.64 for all schooling groups. This large change in earnings
(over 30 percent on average) would have by itself almost no effect on in-
equality —Eis almost completely insensitive to changes in 13 in this range.
The indirect effect (through changes in the participation rate) would also
be only modest, As said earlier, wage equalization would require differen-
tial wage increases and hence induce differential changes in the participa-
tion rate across the various education groups. Wives' hourly earnings should
increase by 72, 41, and 13 percent, respectively, and the induced changes in
participation would be 10, 8 and 3 percentage points. The increase in parti—
cipation, for the sample as a whole, would be 8 rcent (from 0.40 to 0.48).
This increase would reduce E from 0.93 to 0.9l.---"
The high incidence of part—time work among women (working wivesreport
an average of 34 hours per week as compared with an average of 47 hours
for their husbands) is associated with a larger variability (both in relative
and in absolute terms) in their annual working hours. Would a reduction in
this variability affect family earning inequality? Eliminating this diffe-
rence in variability, given full wage equality, would make the wives' monthly
earnings dispersion equal that of husbands'. This reduction inC2 from the
observed 0.64 to 0.53 little affects our results —thevalues of E for the
initial values P =0.40and 13 =0.46fall from 0.93 to 0.92, and for
P =0.48and 13 =0.64from 0.91 to 0.81.
Finally, the increased participation of wives may strengthen the corre-
lation between wives' and husbands' earnings. We used as anupper limit the
correlation between the hourly earnings of wives and husbands when both are
employed (p =0.2)./The increase in the correlation coefficient, other
'The differentialchanges in participation and hourly earnings have also
only a surprisingly small effect on between—group variation. The elimination
of discrimination increases the earnings of anaverage wife with less than 8
years of schooling by 150 percent, and those of a wife with more than 12
years of schooling by less than 20 percent. However, given the initial dif-
ferentials in earnings and in the shares in family income, the earnings dif-
ferentials between the two groups hardly change.
'The estimate of thecorrelation coefficient between husband's and wife's
earnings may suffer from a selectivity bias (see the appendix). Smith sug-
gests a correction of the variances and the covariance of husband's and wife's
hourly earnings accounting for possible censoring bias. This correction
did little to alter our results.—25—
things being equal, reduces the egalitarian impact of wives' earnings
(for P0.40 and=0.46E =0.96and when P andincrease to 0.48 and
0.64 E =0.94).
In order to fully assess the distributional effect of women's earnings,
it is necessary to examine the contribution to inequality of other sources
of family income. Table 7 describes the mean incomes and coefficients of
variation for the population as a whole and for the various ethnic and
schooling groups given alternative definitions of gross income. Using as
basis of comparison the family earnings, wife's earnings excluded, it is
observed (comparing the third and fourth row) that in the aggregate the
egalitarian effect of wife's earnings is almost as strong as that of trans-
fer income.L' There exist, however, fundamental differences. While wives'
earnings have an equalizing effect mainly for the European—American and the
higher schooling groups (i.e., years of schooling greater than 8), the
impact of transfers is concentrated almost exclusively in the Asian—African
and lower education groups. Consequently, whereas wives' earnings have
been noticed to sharpen the intergroup differences, these are hardly
affected by non—labor income.'
Finally, the analysis up to now ignored the effect of taxes. The
introduction of taxes does not affect any of our previous findings concern-
ing labor supply and the earnings structure. It calls, however, for some
modification of the conclusions on the impact of wives' earnings on inequality.
Wives and husbands file in Israel separate income tax returns. Conse-
quently, their marginal tax rates are independent. Having imputed the taxes
paid by husbands and wives I computed the after tax income from the various
sources (Table 8) .?±/Thecomparison of gross earnings and net earnings in
'The base includesearnings of other members of the household besides the
husband and his wife. The comparison of Tables 6 and 7 indicatesthat these
earnings by themselves have an equalizing effect, being in particular
important in the low schooling and Asian—African group. Non—labor income
includes capital income (rent, interest, dividends), socialsecurity and
welfare receipts and other private and public transfers.Reported capital
income, which constitutes about 40 percent of the non—labor incomehardly
affects our indices of inequality in the aggregate and for the individual
groups (the only exception being the schooling group 13+). The changes in
the index of inequality reported in Table 7are, therefore, due primarily to
the transfer payments.
The transfers reduce between—group variability but this effect is offset
by the effect of capital income.
'Using the tax data in the sample of estimatedseparate tax functions for
husbands and wives:T1 =—230.00+ 22.188 HEARN + 0.147 (HEARN)2R2 =0.74
(5.97) (13.52) (9.85)
T2 =—41.57+ 12.300 WEARN + 0.252 (WEARN)2 -24.034childrenR2 =0.80
(2.41) (10.39) (12.98) (5.48)
where monthly earnings (EARN) are measured in 100 of Isreali pounds (IL).
The imputed taxes have a small upward bias but this does not affect the relative
variability of net earnings in the sample.—26—
TABLE7:THEEFFECTOF WIVES' EARNINGS ON FANILY INCOME INEQUALITY
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earnings 1972.57 6061.57 14020.98
Labor exci. 27560.741.00 35820.791.00 40880.651.00
Income*md. 29540.720.97 41880.700.89 54900.540.83
Gross exci. 32730.600.81 40030.730.93 45480.630.97
Income**
mci. 34710.590.79 46100.660.84 59500.520.80
Total exci. 38570.570.76 48480.650.83 57360.570.88
Income***
mci. 40550.560.76 5455 0.600.76 71380.490.76
*Labor income includes earnings of all household members as well as self—
employment income.
**Gross income includes labor and non—labor income (capital income and transfers).
***Total income consists of gross income and imputed income for housing and
car services.—27—
Tables 7 and 8 is illuminating. The lower effective marginal taxratefor
wives reduces the progressivity of the tax structure. The inequality in
the distribution of wives' earnings is much less affected by taxes than
the inequality of other earnings. Thus, whereas taxes reduce the coefficient
of variation of other labor income from 0.76 to 0.62 (the second row in both
tables) the coefficient for wives declines only from 1.67 to 1.60. In this
fashion, the tax structure neutralizes to a large extent the equalizing
effect of wives' earnings on family income. Their effect on inequality
of labor income is cut by half and their effect on inequality of net income
becomes almost negligible. Wives' earnings maintain their equalizing
effect (though this effect is somewhat mitigated) for the higher schooling
and European—American group, but they have a perverse effect on inequality
in the low education and Asian—African group. The tax structure, thus,
enhances the divisive effect of the wiv9s' earnings, increasing income
inequality between the social groups.--ZJ
'The following table describes thebetween—group coefficients of variation
for earnings before and after taxes with wives earnings included and
excluded.
Between schooling groups Between ethnic groups
Before After Before After
taxes taxes taxes taxes
Wives' excluded 0.155 0.135 0.054 0.039
earnings included 0.238 0.227 0.091 0.079
The lower effective marginal taxes on wives' earnings tend to erode the little
effect taxes have on closing intergroup disparities.—28—
TABLE 8: THEEFFECTOF WIVES' EARNINGS ON FAMILY INCOME INEQUALITY
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*See definition in Table 7.—29—
E.SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS
ithas beenshown in the last section that wives' earnings have an
egalitarian effect on family income inequality, and that this is
particularly pronounced where the wife is European-I\xnerican or Israeli
born and when she has a higher education. The effect of sex—related
discrimination is somewhat ambiguous. Its primary effect is regressive,
since it undermines a reduction in inequality due to a wage induced
increase in wives' labor force participation. However, this effect may
be overshadowed by secondary effects (for example, a strengthening of the
correlation between wives' and husbands' earnings) which work in the
opposite direction. In either case, the first round effects of discrim-
ination on family inequality are relatively small, though the long run
effects, through changes in fertility patterns, differentiation of roles
in the household, and the wives' commitment to a market career (effects
not investigated in this paper) may be considerable. The filing of
separate income tax returns erodes the progressive effect of wives'
earnings, and though it narrows the after tax wage differential between
wives and husbands, it widens the earning gap between social groups (be
they identif led by education or ethnic origin).
To what extent are these results sensitive to the specific choice of
the income inequality measure? The analysis focused on the coefficient
of variation, but our conclusions would have been unaffected had we used
the variance of the logarithm of income.!i' Furthermore, any summary
measure, such as the one used in the paper, is incapable of capturing
all the dimensions of the problem. For example, it ignores altogether
an important aspect of wivesT earnings, serving as a vehicle for social
mobility. In fact, even when the summary measure is hardly affected by
the inclusion of the wives' earnings (for example when one uses the
coefficients of variation of total income including imputed income in
table 7) an examination of the relative ranking of families in terms of
their incomes is very sensitive to the size of the wives' earnings. This
is exemplified by table 9, which ranks the families according to their
total income and their income minus the wives' earnings.
28/—
Let denote family earnings, then
ln =
ln(Y1+Y2)
=in + ln[l +
Hence
VAR[ln Y] =VAR[lnY1]+ VAR[ln(l+(Y2/Y1))I +2pVAR[lnY1VAR[1fl((Y2l)
where
ln(i+) when the wife participates (P =1)
ln[l + 2"1 =0 when the wive does not participate (P =0)
The analysis in terms of VAR(ln should not vary much from the analysis
of this paper even at the analytical level.—30—









1 0.830.090.050.010.02 0 0 0 0 0 1.00
2 0.170.630.070.050.050.010.02 0 0 0 1.00
3 00.270.420.100.080.060.060.010.00 0 1.00
4 0 00.460.250.090.100.070.030.00 0 1.00
5 0 0 00.600.100.080.110.100.01 0 1.00
6 0 0 0 00.620.090.120.130.04 0 1.00
7 0 0 0 00.030.630.110.100.110.02 1.00
8 0 0 0 0 00.030.520.190.200.06 1.00
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 00.440.370.19i.eo
10 0 0










The analysis focuses on the inequality in family earnings, ignoring
single people. It may very well be that by this choice we inadvertently
overlook the case where wives have the greatest impact on overall
inequality by widening the income gap between multiperson and single
person units. Moreover, by ignoring the differential effect wives'
earnings have in families of different sizes (because of the negative
correlation between the wife's earnings and the number and age of her
children), we do not consider another important aspect —theeffect on
per capita (or adult equivalent) income inequality.
The analysis does not take account of the opportunity of the wife's
work in the market. I have shown elsewhere (Gronau, 1976) that the increase
in the labor supply to the market comes, to a large extent, at the expense of
work at home. In 1970 employed Israeli women spent on average 6.6 hours
daily in work in the market and 2.9 hours in work at home, while non—employed
spent 6.7 hours daily in work at home (housework, shopping, and children).
It is difficult to attach a monetary figure to the value of home production
lost as a result of this reallocation of working time. But a crude measure
based on U.S. data (Gronau 1980) indicates that this loss is over one
third of wives' earnings, and reaches 85 percent when the family has young
children (children under 6). /
Finally,our findings are crucially dependent on the Israeli parameters,
and cannot be used as a basis for generalizations. The Israeli experience
should be regarded as unique, as should any other example. Given the
Israeli parameters (P =0.4,f3 =0.46,and p =0.1)wives' earnings have
been shown to have an important egalitarian effect. However, had the
correlation between husband's and wife's earnings been 0.4 (rather than
0.1), the effect would have been in the opposite direction, wives' earnings
exerting a regressive influence on inequality. Similarly, the finding
that the wife—husband wage gap bears only a relatively small cost in
terms of family income inequality is true only for the circumstances
prevailing in the Israeli labor market in the mid-70's. Had the wives'
participation rate been P =0.6rather than P =0.4the effect of
discrimination would have doubled.' The sensitivity of family income
inequality to changes in the parameters increases the higher the parti-
cipation rate and the wife—husband earnings ratio. A lesson to be learned
from this paper, therefore, is that there are no easy generalizations.
This is a very discouraging conclusion given the ever increasing
importance of women's earnings from both a social and economic viewpoint.
Hopefully, however, this paper provides a framework for the evaluation
of their effect on inequality in each historical instance.
29/—
Accordingto these U.S. data the foregone home production increased
both in absolute and in relative terms with education.
30/—
WhenP =0.6and=0.46,H =0.88.An increase in participation of
8 percentage points to P =0.68and an increase in the wife—husband
earnings ratio to=0.64due to the elimination of the wage gap would
have reduced E to E =0.84.—32—
APPENDIX: THE ESTIMATION OF THE CENSORING BIAS*
Let W. denote the individual's wage rate and R. his reservation wage,











=v.The expected wages of the partners in a sample
where the wife is employed are:
E(W1I >v)=AX+E(u1I
>v) for husbands
E(W211 >v)=BY+ E(u2!I >v) for wives.
These are biased estimates of AX and BY if the conditional expectations of
u1





where Aisthe inverse of the Mills ratio corresponding to hG, i.e.,
A =f(I/o)/F(I/c) ,wheref and F denote the density and the cumulative
density of the standardized normal distribution.The direction of the bias
depends on the regression coefficients among the residuals (b..). The hus-
band's wage has an upward bias if b21 >b31(i.e., if the husband's market
productivity has a greater effect on his wife's market productivity than it
has on her home productivity). The wife's wage is upward biased if
b12 <1(i.e., if a unit increase in market productivity is associated with
a smaller increase in home productivity.
Finally, residual variances and covariances may be biased estimators
of the true variance—covariance matrix because:
cov(, u.II> v)=- a.(A2+IA)
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